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# Federal quantum-security plan sets 2030 and 2031 migration deadlines
- URL: https://pvweekly.com/federal-post-quantum-migration/
- Published: 2026-10-27T19:29:59.000Z
- Updated: 2026-10-27T19:29:59.000Z
- Description: 2026 archive · The June policy separates the cryptography used to establish secret keys from digital signatures, and directs agencies to build the changes into ordinary system upgrades.
- Author: PV Weekly Editorial
- Tags: Technology & Defense, Archive 2026, #ledger-format, #archive-backfill-20261027

**2026 archive** · June 24, 2026Reporting prepared October 22, 2026\. This retrospective describes events and expectations from the period covered.[Browse the archive](https://pvweekly.com/archive/)

Federal agencies received two different deadlines for a major cryptographic overhaul in June 2026: the end of 2030 for key establishment on high-value and high-impact systems, and the end of 2031 for digital signatures.

The June 22 executive order directed that transition through Office of Management and Budget guidance. OMB’s June 24 memorandum then required agency migration plans within 120 days and set out a phased approach to implementation.

The split reflects two jobs cryptography performs. Key establishment creates the secret material used to protect a communication. Digital signatures help verify who sent information and whether it changed. Updating one does not automatically replace the other.

The policy addressed a future threat with consequences for today’s systems. OMB said a quantum computer capable of breaking widely used cryptography was not known to exist. But information and technology can remain sensitive for years, so agencies were directed to prioritize systems holding data expected to retain mission sensitivity in 2030.

The order required each agency to identify a migration lead within 30 days. OMB placed the work within broader agency governance, with defined responsibility beyond the chief information officer’s office.

Its practical instruction was to connect cryptographic upgrades to work agencies already undertake: cloud migrations, software development and hardware replacement. Systems unable to support the needed cryptography were to be identified for replacement or retirement.

National security systems were excluded from these OMB requirements; the executive order addressed their progress through a separate reporting provision. The order also called for a proposed procurement rule affecting covered contractors. That instruction was a rulemaking step, not proof that new clauses had already entered every contract.

The result was a sequence of accountable work: identify the systems, assign responsibility, test replacements and migrate in priority order. The calendar made cryptography a near-term modernization decision even though the arrival date of the quantum threat remained uncertain.

## Sources

- [Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/securing-the-nation-against-advanced-cryptographic-attacks/?ref=pvweekly.com) — The White House · 2026-06-22.
- [Execution of the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography, M-26-15](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/M-26-15-Execution-of-the-Migration-to-Post-Quantum-Cryptography.pdf?ref=pvweekly.com) — Office of Management and Budget · 2026-06-24.